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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-2694
___________
WILLIAM SLAVOSKI,
Appellant
v.
FRANK PAWLOWSKI; HUASCAR RIVERA;
JOHN RICE; MERVIN RODRIGUEZ;
FRANCIS J. HACKEN; BRYON DEVLIN;
WILLARD OLIPHANT; PEDRO RIVERA
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3-10-cv-02139)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
___________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 6, 2012
Before: SLOVITER, GARTH, Circuit Judges, and
PADOVA, ∗ Senior District Judge
(Filed: February 7, 2012 )
_________
OPINION
_________
The Honorable John R. Padova, Senior Judge, United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

∗

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
United States Secret Service Agent William Slavoski filed a civil rights complaint
(pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983) against employees of the Pennsylvania State Police
(“PSP”), including Commissioner Frank Pawlowski, Mervin Rodriguez, John Rice,
Francis Hacken, Bryon Devlin, Willard Oliphant, Huascar Rivera, and Pedro Rivera
(collectively “Defendants”). Slavoski alleged that Defendants violated his constitutional
rights by accusing him of using a law enforcement computer database for unauthorized
reasons, unlawfully targeting him, and retaliating against him when he filed formal
complaints against them. The District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim, and denied Slavoski’s motion for reconsideration of that decision. Slavoski
appealed. We will affirm.
I.
Background
Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recount only the facts that are
essential to our decision. Slavoski accessed a criminal information databank on behalf of
a member of the Kingston Police Department, Detective David Griffin. Griffin had asked
Slavoski to obtain information about a vehicle because Griffin believed that he was being
stalked. The databank showed that the vehicle was registered to defendant Willard
Oliphant and his son Will. At the time, Oliphant was employed by the Pennsylvania
State Police as a captain.
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Apparently motivated by Slavoski’s inquiry on behalf of Griffin, defendant Bryan
Devlin conducted an audit of the databank’s terminal less than two months later. About a
year later, defendant Mervin Rodriguez accused Slavoski of misusing the Commonwealth
Law Enforcement Assistance Network (“CLEAN”) and improperly disseminating
information from it to Griffin. Rodriguez told Slavoski that he would be on probation for
a year. 1 Devlin, Rodriguez, Rivera, and Hacken also acquired Slavoski’s personal
address by auditing the databank. The Defendants continued to investigate Slavoski, and
he remained on probation.
Slavoski argues that Defendants acted in retaliation for his “innocent and lawful
use” of the databank because it “exposed the Oliphant’s [sic] personally,” in violation of
Slavoski’s First Amendment rights. App. at 25. He also argues that the audit was an
unlawful search in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and that his Equal
Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated.
II.
Analysis
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this § 1983 civil rights
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and this court has jurisdiction over this
appeal of a final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a
District Court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009). “To
1

The probation that Mr. Rodriguez administered was a probation involving the
use of the “CLEAN” network.
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survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Slavoski failed to state a claim
of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment because he was put on probation for his
alleged unauthorized use of the database before he made any complaints against the
Pennsylvania State Police. Therefore, even if we accept that filing those complaints was
protected First Amendment activity, Slavoski failed to allege any facts demonstrating
retaliatory action that occurred in response to that activity. Moreover, actions taken by
Defendants after Slavoski filed his complaints do not qualify as retaliatory actions. See
Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004) (“In general,
constitutional retaliation claims are analyzed under a three-part test. Plaintiff must prove
(1) that he engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that the government
responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity caused the retaliation.”).
We also agree with the District Court’s reasoning as to why Slavoski has failed to
state a claim under the Fourth Amendment: even assuming that Slavoski had a subjective
expectation of privacy as to the information he searched on the database at the computer
terminal at his work, that expectation was objectively unreasonable. See Minnesota v.
Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95 (1990) (“[C]apacity to claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person who claims the protection of the
Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12
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(1978) (“Obviously, however, a ‘legitimate’ expectation of privacy by definition means
more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered.”).
The District Court’s reasoning as to why Slavoski failed to state a claim that
Defendants violated his Equal Protection rights is also sound. Slavoski did not allege any
facts showing that he was treated differently than any similarly situated individuals, and
even if he had, the decision as to how to deal with misuse of the databases was solely
within the discretion of the Pennsylvania State Police. See Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of
Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 603 (2008) (“[T]reating like individuals differently is an accepted
consequence of the discretion granted” when state action involves “discretionary
decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments.”).
III.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s decision.
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